Contract evidence

The System Doesn't Just Store Video. It Builds Data Over Time.

The contract focuses on footage: video and photos. But it also allows Flock to analyze that footage, turn it into data, and use that data to improve its systems over time.

Even if video and photos are deleted, the information learned from them can continue to be used.

Short version

Video and photos can be deleted.

The data created from them can still live on.

The contract does not clearly block the sale, export, or monetization of machine-learned data derived from the images.

Plain-English concern

The contract protects footage more clearly than the data created from videos and photos.

The footage may be temporary. The data isn't clearly temporary. The contract says Footage is deleted on a rolling retention schedule, but it separately lets Flock collect, analyze, anonymize, use, distribute, and improve systems with data created from those videos and photos.

Anonymized does not always mean untraceable in practice. When data is stripped of direct identifiers, it can still be combined with other datasets, used to find patterns, and sometimes linked back to real-world identities in certain contexts.

The more sources that are combined, the easier it can become to connect patterns back to individuals. That is why this is not just about cameras. It is about how data is created, combined, and used over time.

The city's claim vs. the contract

"Not sold" is not the same as "not used."

On September 8, 2026, the Police Chief told City Council that Flock does not sell or share the city's data "independently" or "for commercial purposes." Read the contract.

The city told the council

“Under the City's contract and applicable Flock policies, Flock does not independently sell or share CGPD's ALPR or PTZ data for commercial purposes.”
Chief's agenda document, page 6

The record shows

Notice the words "independently" and "for commercial purposes." Now read the contract.

The city gives Flock a "non-exclusive, royalty-free, irrevocable, worldwide license" to use the data. Flock may also "collect, analyze, anonymize" it and use it to "train machine learning algorithms," with a "worldwide, perpetual, royalty-free" right to what it learns.

Not sold is not the same as not used. Casa Grande pays $10 million and hands Flock the raw material for its AI for free. Google pays for the imagery it collects. Flock gets Casa Grande's from taxpayers.

$10M

paid to Flock, which keeps a forever license to what it learns

See it yourself

Why this matters for families

The concern is not only what a camera sees today.

It is what the system can keep, learn from, and reuse after the original photo or video is gone.

Plain English

Perpetual = forever.

The city grants Flock a license to certain data created from Casa Grande images forever, even after the contract is over.

Photos can be deleted. Data can live on.

Even if the original image is removed, information learned from it can still be used, licensed, and combined with other records.

Location plus visual data is powerful.

When location and visual data can be searched together, they reveal where people go, when they go there, and what they look like.

Anonymized does not mean anonymous.

Large language models and open-source intelligence make it far easier to connect "anonymized" location, time, vehicle, and visual patterns back to real families.

Children cannot consent to this.

A child's data can be swept into the system before they are old enough to make decisions about their own privacy, then licensed for future use.

Ask the council to renegotiate so Flock cannot train its products on Casa Grande data.

Highlighted source sections

Key contract language residents should see for themselves.

These screenshots come from the Casa Grande contract with Flock Group Inc. The highlights show the clauses behind the plain-English concerns on this page.

Contract excerpts are shown for public-interest commentary and source attribution. The full contract PDF is linked so readers can review the complete record in context.

Contract page 6 / Section 4.1

Customer Data is licensed broadly to Flock

The no-sale language is important, but it is aimed at Customer Data. The bigger concern is whether the contract blocks use, export, or monetization of data learned from the images.

Contract page 7 / Section 4.3

Anonymized data can be used to train and improve systems over time

This is the core weakness: video and photos can be deleted, but information learned from them can still help train and improve the system.

Contract page 9 / Section 5.3

The contract allows access, preservation, and disclosure in broad situations

This does not mean every disclosure will happen, but it shows why access rules, audit logs, and clear public limits matter, and why a city promise about federal sharing cannot bind Flock.

Contract page 25 / FlockOS features

The system is built to connect searches across networks and location history

When location data is combined with other databases, a vehicle search can start revealing patterns about real people, not just cars. The released logs show Casa Grande searches reaching every state.

Key weaknesses in the contract

What should be fixed immediately.

These weaknesses do not require guessing about secret behavior. They come from what the contract says, what it does not say, and what residents should demand in enforceable public rules.

Footage vs. data loophole

The contract protects video and photos more clearly than the data created from them.

Broad anonymized data rights

The contract lets Flock analyze video and photos, create anonymized data, and use that data to improve systems.

Perpetual use of derived data

There is no clear expiration date for anonymized or derived data used to train and improve Flock systems.

No strong limits on secondary use

The contract allows improvement, development, diagnostics, correction, and other Flock offerings without narrow public boundaries.

No independent oversight requirement

The contract does not require third-party audits, public reporting, or independent verification of compliance.

Weak accountability language

The contract does not create clear misuse penalties, defined consequences, or public enforcement mechanisms for abusive searches.

Ambiguity around access and sharing

The contract leaves residents without plain answers about exactly who can access the system and how interagency sharing is controlled.

No clear warrant requirement

The agreement does not require warrants, probable cause, or search-scope limits for sensitive location-history searches.

Bottom line

Casa Grande needs enforceable contract limits, not vague assurances.

The petition asks for stronger limits on derived data, warrants or comparable standards for sensitive searches, independent audits, public reporting, and clear consequences for misuse.